[REPORT] Russia, a uranium hub…
Published in 2023
by Greenpeace
After highlighting France's dependence on Russia for the export of its nuclear waste and its supply of enriched uranium, Greenpeace France is lifting the veil on a secret closely guarded by the nuclear industry and the French government: Russian authorities have control over a huge portion of French imports of natural uranium from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
France almost tripled its imports of Russian enriched uranium in the midst of the invasion of Ukraine, with Russia delivering, in 2022, a third of the enriched uranium needed to operate French nuclear power plants for a year. That same year, nearly half of the natural uranium imported into France came from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while almost all of the natural uranium from Kazakhstan, and a considerable portion of that from Uzbekistan, passes through the hands of Rosatom, which controls the transport of all nuclear materials transiting Russian soil. Also in 2022, all of France's exports of reprocessed uranium (URT) were sent to Russia, and all of France's imports of reenriched uranium (URE) came from Russia.
While Volodymyr Zelensky continues to call for European sanctions against Rosatom, which has occupied the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant since March 4, 2022, the invasion of Ukraine does not appear to be slowing down the trade of this giant of the Russian nuclear industry. Rosatom, a sprawling geopolitical tool at the Kremlin's service, is functioning perfectly. The routes that would allow the transport of Kazakh and Uzbek uranium bypassing Russian soil, such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), do not currently represent real alternatives, given the immense challenges of making them operational. Despite their desire for independence from Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are not in a position to quickly free themselves from their dependence on Rosatom subsidiaries and the use of cargo ships chartered by controversial Russian figures to export their natural uranium.
Contrary to what nuclear advocates claim, the French nuclear industry is immensely dependent on Russian authorities , which could explain why France continues to actively oppose sanctions against Rosatom at the European level. Far from guaranteeing energy independence, the revival of nuclear power will keep France dependent on uranium supplier countries like Russia. In line with its rhetoric of support for the Ukrainian people, the French state must therefore demand the termination of all contracts linking EDF, Orano and Framatome to Rosatom , stop defending Rosatom's interests at the European level and work to have this Kremlin-controlled company included on the list of companies targeted by European sanctions.
Russia as a uranium hub
Rosatom controls all uranium transit through Russia, including a significant portion of natural uranium imported from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to France.
Excerpt from the REPORT
P. 66
IV. Relations between Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
Russia and Kazakhstan
Close cooperation and projects in the nuclear industry According to the World Nuclear Association, several cooperation agreements have been signed between Russian and Kazakh nuclear enterprises over the past 20 years, concerning the infrastructure for the production and enrichment of Kazakh uranium in Russia, the project to build a Russian nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, and the development of a global nuclear fuel system.
A press release published by Kazatomprom in May 2022 emphasized that “Rosatom has expressed interest in increasing investments in the uranium mining industry of Kazakhstan”. Since Kazakhstan’s nuclear industry is a legacy of Soviet-era nuclear power plant construction projects, it is not surprising that its development remains dependent on Russia. The two remain closely linked, not only from a technical but also from a human perspective, as Kazatomprom’s top managers have often been trained in Russia since the Soviet era. For example, former directors (“chairmen of the board”) of Kazatomprom include: Mazhit Sharipov (2021-2022) studied at the Obninsk Institute of Nuclear Engineering, located in Russia; Galymzhan Pirmatov (2017-2021) graduated from Novosibirsk State University; Vladimir Shkolnik (2009-2014), Novosibirsk State Institute of Nuclear Engineering, etc. These ties allow for a special closeness to Russia, especially in its nuclear sector, in the context of managing the state-owned enterprise Kazatomprom.
Russian influence over Kazatomprom’s management is only an indirect side of the collusion between the Kazakh mining company’s historical leaders and Russia. Operating in a sector that is largely controlled by the Kazakh state and is crucial to Kazakhstan’s economic development, Kazatomprom does not shy away from power plays in a country that has remained closely tied economically and politically to Russia during Nursultan Nazarbayev’s decades of rule.
Some examples clearly demonstrate Kazatomprom’s historical closeness to the Russian government and even to Rosatom. This is the case with the Kazakh company’s former president Vladimir Shkolnik (Kazatomprom’s chairman from 2009 to 2014), who then became Kazakhstan’s energy minister from 2014 to 2016. Vladimir Shkolnik is reportedly related to Vadim Zhikhov, then CEO of Rosatom subsidiary arms, for whom he was a “liaison” in Kazakhstan, according to an article in Radio Azattyk, a media outlet affiliated with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Azattyk. This closeness was particularly evident because Vladimir Shkolnik was the head of Kazatomprom during ARMZ’s takeover of Uranium One (originally Uranium One was a Canadian company that ARMZ gradually acquired between 2009 and 2013), which gave Rosatom control over one of the world’s largest enterprises, supplying a significant portion of Kazakhstan’s uranium mining sector.
Other connections link former Kazatomprom executives to the Russian elite. Kazakh oligarch Timur Kulibayev, who served as chairman of Kazatomprom from 2008 to 2012, was a member of Gazprom's board for more than 10 years (from 2011 to 2022). His wife, Dinara Kulibayeva, is one of the daughters of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, known for her closeness to the Kremlin. He has proven to be one of the most successful partners, influential and richest people in Kazakhstan, inextricably linked to corruption during the Nazarbayev era.
Even today, in addition to Rosatom, Kazakh and Russian oligarchs continue to maintain business relations in the field of fossil fuel production in Kazakhstan.
These links are evidenced by the addition of JV Budenovskoye LLC, which is to operate sections 6 and 7 of the Budenevskoye mine in Kazakhstan (its commercial operations are scheduled to begin in 2022), whose future production is destined for the Russian civilian nuclear industry. On the surface, it is owned by two Kazakh companies, Kazatomprom and the Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine (GMCC; Russian: Степногорский горно-химические комбинат). However, an examination of the structure of SMCC reveals that it is controlled by Russian capital.
SMCC was founded in 2004 in Kazakhstan, but its origins date back to the 1940s and the early Soviet uranium mining projects. Kazakhstan’s energy and mining sectors were largely privatised late last year, often to the benefit of Russian or Kazakh businessmen who gained control of the country’s key assets by exploiting government corruption. 162 Today, the company is 60% owned by Ganberg UK Ltd and 40% by Gexior UK Ltd, 163 both registered in the UK, with a majority stake owned by Devegol UK Limited, 164 also UK-based. The latter’s ultimate beneficiaries are Kazakh oligarch Yakov Klebanov (who owns between 25 and 50%) and Russian billionaire Vasily Anisimov (who owns between 50 and 75%). Vasily Anisimov is the former president of the Russian Judo Federation and the 54th richest person in Russia according to Forbes. He is the head of Coalco International (commercial and residential real estate, industrial parks, land plots), which owns aluminum smelters, bauxite mines, semi-finished products manufacturers, cable factories, energy producers and cryolite plants, as well as real estate. Coalco owns 14,974 hectares of land in the Moscow region. V. Anisimov, according to observers, is a close friend of Arkady Rotenberg, a childhood friend of Vladimir Putin167. The example of this company illustrates the collusion between Russian and Kazakh oligarchs and the fact that Russian businessmen, often well-connected in the Kremlin, continue to be present in many strategic sectors of the Kazakh economy.
Geopolitical Ties between Kazakhstan and Russia
Astana is developing its ties with other players in the region, particularly China, whose very ambitious road initiative heavily includes Kazakhstan. It also maintains good relations with Western countries, as demonstrated by the visit of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Paris on November 29 and 30 last year. The current government, compared to that of Nursultan Nazarbayev, seems to want to further diversify its partners outside of Russia. A clear sign was Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s decision to refuse to recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk territories.
On the other hand, Tokayev’s use of Russian troops (under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO, a military-political organization heavily dominated by Russia170) to combat unrest in January 2022 calls into question Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian power for security and peacekeeping. current government.
In addition, energy export routes to Central Asia are largely inherited from the Soviet period and are therefore oriented towards Russia. Kazakhstan thus remained heavily dependent on Russia for its oil exports, which were mainly destined for the European Union, its main customer. This is one example of how Moscow has blocked various projects of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (or Caspian Pipeline Consortium, CPC) since the beginning of the Ukrainian invasion. This 1,511 km pipeline connects the fields of northern Kazakhstan (these are the Karachaganak fields, near the Urals, on the border with Russia, and Kachagan and Tengiz on the Caspian Sea) with the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Thanks to it, Estonia was able to export 53 million tons of oil in 2021173, accounting for more than two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s crude oil exports.
In July 2022, a Russian court decision to temporarily block the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (officially due to documentary irregularities) came two days after Kazakhstan offered to sell more oil to the European Union given the military situation. The blocking of the CPC pipeline is a reminder of the risk posed by supply chains that pass through Russia or, as in the case of coal transport, use infrastructure located on Russian territory. It highlights the decisive role that Russia plays in controlling hydrocarbon exports from Kazakhstan and, therefore, its strong leverage over the country. The various alternatives developed by Kazakhstan at this stage allow it to replace only a small share of the hydrocarbons exported through Russia today.
p.94
CONCLUSION
From the import of enriched uranium to the transport of natural uranium and the re-enrichment of reprocessed uranium, France's nuclear industry is under the control of Rosatom.
Almost all of the natural uranium coming from Kazakhstan and a significant portion of the natural uranium coming from Uzbekistan ends up in the hands of Rosatom, which controls the transport of all nuclear materials transiting Russia. In 2022, at the height of the invasion of Ukraine, almost half (43%) of the natural uranium imported into France came from these two former Soviet republics. In 2022, two-thirds of France's enriched uranium imports (67%) came from Russia, the bulk of France's reprocessed uranium exports (URT) went to Russia, and the bulk of France's enriched uranium imports (ERUs) came from Russia. These shipments are made under contracts between EDF, Orano, Framatome and Rosatom, the Russian nuclear giant that handles uranium transportation, has a global monopoly on uranium re-enrichment and powerful natural uranium enrichment capacity.
Russia is a hub for the trade in uranium coming from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Natural uranium mined in mines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is transported by truck and then by train by Rosatom subsidiaries Atomspetstrans and Isotop, the cornerstones of road and rail transport in Russia. Natural uranium can be enriched in Russia, which offers very competitive prices, or loaded onto cargo ships at the port of St. Petersburg. This was the main staging point for Russian cargo ships heading west with uranium, and sometimes returning with a cargo of nuclear waste, which was then delivered to Tomsk-7 or Seversk, a secret city wiped off the map.
Greenpeace France's latest surveillance of natural, enriched and ERU, as well as reprocessed uranium shipments between France and Russia has revealed the important role of two Russian ships: the Mikhail Dudin and the Mikhail Lomonosov, chartered respectively by the North-West Shipping Company and the Northern Shipping Company, companies linked to two controversial figures close to the Russian state: Vladimir Lisin and Nikolai Kulikov. Nikolai Kulikov's Northern Shipping Company is now under US sanctions. As for Vladimir Lisin, the oligarch who runs a steel empire in Russia, he is under Australian sanctions and has Russia, a uranium hub, an organisation that has recently been the subject of several publications exposing illegal activities in the service of the Kremlin.
There are alternative transit routes for natural gas from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan through Russian territory, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), a rail and ferry cargo system connecting China to Europe. However, these routes are far from being the routes to freedom from the Russian regime. TITR has only about 5% of the capacity of the road through Russia, and its infrastructure requires a very significant upgrade, which is a significant investment for countries in the region. Extended delivery times, administrative problems, low export quotas... these logistical complications are compounded by geopolitical challenges such as the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the occupation of Georgian territory by Russia, and tensions between the West, China, and Iran. In addition, Russia has many levers of pressure on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, starting with its role in the development and export of hydrocarbons from these two countries, which rely heavily on this sector.
The economic, geopolitical, and infrastructural ties between Russia and these two former Soviet republics, especially Kazakhstan, the world's largest natural aluminum producer, are so strong that despite their aspirations for independence, liberation from Russia is far from becoming a reality.
Despite Rosatom being one of the main culprits in the invasion of Ukraine due to its controversial occupation of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, its business with the rest of the world is going well, especially with France. In 2022, at the height of the invasion of Ukraine, France’s enriched uranium imports from Russia almost tripled compared to 2021, from 110 to 312 tons. On average since the 2000s, about 40% of France’s enriched uranium imports came from Russia, compared to 67% in 2022.
France’s dependence on Russia is therefore strong throughout the fuel cycle, but also in the entire nuclear sector. EDF subsidiary Framatome not only uses Russian uranium to produce fuel for French and European nuclear power plants, but also continues to collaborate with Rosatom, in particular with the supply of equipment for the construction of two Russian reactors in Hungary. Framatome has also requested permission to expand the storage space for re-enriched reprocessed uranium (URE) at the Tricastin site, despite the fact that the supply of this URE is entirely dependent on Russia.
The French government and nuclear energy producers are hiding behind the lack of sanctions against Rosatom at the European level in order to continue their collaboration, while playing the same game as European countries dependent on Rosatom, such as Hungary, Finland or Slovakia, in order to avoid the company being included in the sanctions list.
The French government, by turning a blind eye to the close ties between the French nuclear industry and Rosatom, is participating in the strengthening of a geostrategic instrument at the service of the Kremlin. The construction of new nuclear reactors, far from ensuring our energy independence, will maintain France's dependence on aluminum-supplier countries such as Russia.
OUR REQUEST
The French state, which is the majority shareholder of Orano and EDF, must demand the termination of their contracts with Tenex in order to stop trading uranium and nuclear waste with Russia. The French state must stop cooperation between its institutions, the French nuclear industry and Rosatom. The French state must actively seek to include Rosatom in the list of European sanctions against Russia. The French State should shed light on the uranium trade by compiling and making available information on the import and export of uranium from France to and from other countries, detailed for each form/category of uranium (natural uranium, enriched uranium, uranium for reprocessing, enriched uranium for reprocessing and depleted uranium).
https://www.greenpeace.fr/rapport-la-russie-plaque-tournante-de-luranium/
