Why an Economic Corridor Could Anchor a Realistic Peace Formula Response by N. Rakhimbek to the article by V. Tuleshov “Frozen Assets Instead of Territorial Concessions”
August 19, 2025
Beyond Frozen Assets: Why an Economic Corridor Could Anchor a Realistic Peace Formula
Response by Nurul Rakhimbek
In response to the emerging discussions about the U.S. push for a Ukraine–Russia peace framework, I find myself in partial agreement with the idea of using frozen Russian assets as a compensatory mechanism for Ukraine.
Yet I remain skeptical that this alone can serve as the backbone of a viable settlement. The scale of the damage already inflicted on Ukraine far exceeds the currently frozen funds, and the core of any sustainable peace must rest not only on financial transfers but also on long-term economic integration and security guarantees.
So each damage has a value attached, which is even insufficient at the moment. It means someone would still have to pay for the damages. Besides, paying Russians for your own land does not resonate well with me.
The Economic Reality of War Losses
Ukraine’s economic losses are staggering. According to the World Bank and Kyiv School of Economics, the direct damages from Russia’s war already exceed $600 billion, with destroyed infrastructure, housing, and industrial capacity accounting for a major share. Even if the West confiscates and reallocates Russia’s frozen assets (estimated at around $300 billion globally, of which about $200 billion are in Europe), this covers less than half of Ukraine’s reconstruction needs.
Moreover, a simple transfer of frozen funds does not establish a framework for Ukraine’s future growth, trade integration, and regional resilience. Without such a framework, any peace deal risks being only temporary—another “frozen conflict” without an economic anchor.
The Case for Integration Corridors
Instead of framing the peace process as a binary trade of “territories for money,” we should look toward economic integration corridors as part of the settlement. History shows that durable postwar orders—from post-WWII Europe to the Balkans—were stabilized not only by ceasefires but by shared economic interests that made renewed conflict costlier than peace.
Ukraine sits on critical transit and trade lines between the EU, Russia, and Central Asia. Properly developed, these corridors could turn Ukraine into a regional logistics and energy hub rather than a perpetual frontline. For example:
Energy Transit: Even in wartime, Russian gas transits through Ukraine supplied about 12 bcm in 2023, earning Kyiv $1.2 billion in transit fees. A restructured framework could preserve this flow under international oversight, while gradually shifting to EU–Ukraine joint energy projects.
Black Sea Grain Corridor: Ukraine accounted for 10% of global wheat exports and 15% of corn exports pre-war. Rebuilding safe corridors from Odesa to Mediterranean markets could restore a $20–25 billion annual revenue stream.
Industrial Reconstruction Zones: Ukraine’s metallurgy and heavy industry (Mariupol, Dnipro basin) were once worth over $40 billion annually. Even partial recovery under international investment frameworks could revive this sector.
An integration corridor model—linking Ukraine’s reconstruction with trade access for both Russia and Europe under multilateral guarantees—could make peace more economically binding.
Territorial Trade-Offs and Guarantees
Of course, any territorial concession by Ukraine is politically toxic. International law clearly forbids recognition of annexations by force, but one must also recognize that Russia is unlikely to relinquish all occupied areas immediately – economic cooperation could be the key here.
In this context, a ceasefire with the return of the lands under Ukraine’s jurisdiction—combined with economic reconstruction and integration projects across the war region — becomes a more realistic intermediate step.
The absence of NATO membership for Ukraine may be the unavoidable cost of such an arrangement at this stage. But this must be balanced by robust U.S.–EU security guarantees, international monitoring, and above all, an economic recovery compact that makes Ukraine’s survival and growth irreversible.
Toward a Realistic Peace Formula
Instead of focusing solely on frozen Russian assets—which, while important, are insufficient—we should push for a formula that combines:
1. Frozen assets for immediate reconstruction needs (~$300 billion).
2. Integration corridors (grain, energy, transport) with EU, Russia, and Central Asia under international oversight.
3. Security guarantees without NATO, but with U.S.–EU binding commitments.
4. Territorial resolution by returning the land map of 2014 Ukraine.
This approach is not perfect, but it recognizes the primacy of economics in postwar stabilization. It gives Ukraine real resources, makes renewed aggression less attractive, and keeps the West firmly in control of the sanctions–integration mechanism.
In short, peace will not hold on to financial compensation alone. It must be sewn into an economic fabric where Ukraine becomes indispensable to its neighbors, and conflict becomes too costly for Russia to repeat.
Original Article by Valikhan Tuleshov
“Frozen Assets Instead of Territorial Concessions”
Friends! The general formula that is emerging today after the talks in the White House: the desire for a trilateral negotiating format (Ukraine–USA–Russia), combined with the idea of security through guarantees and support from European allies, while maintaining the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but with an unclear Russian interpretation of all these positions, makes me deeply suspicious. Because the exchange of occupied territories of Ukraine at the expense of Ukraine is nonsense. It undermines the basic principle of international law: borders cannot be changed by force.
The peace treaty that Trump wants to conclude cannot be built on this basis, unless frozen Russian assets are given to Ukraine to restore unoccupied but damaged territories. Of course, a “territorial deal in exchange for financial compensation” through the use of frozen Russian assets looks much preferable. Then Russia maintains the status quo in the occupied areas, but does not receive recognition. And Ukraine receives real resources for restoration and strengthens its subjectivity, and the West does not violate the principle of the inviolability of borders, but on the contrary, strengthens it through the sanctions mechanism. And thus, the formula of “frozen assets instead of territorial concessions” may become the core of a future realistic peace formula.
But, in fact, today a ceasefire agreement is needed, because a peace treaty requires agreement on territorial issues, legally recognized obligations, and a long-term security architecture. Russia and Ukraine are not ready for this in the current conditions. Moscow does not recognize itself as an aggressor and will not agree to “give up” territories, and Kyiv will not agree to legitimize the occupation.
A ceasefire agreement, as an intermediate instrument, could record a ceasefire, define de facto but not de jure demarcation lines, launch mechanisms for humanitarian access, prisoner exchange, infrastructure restoration, and open up space for subsequent long peace negotiations. This is closer to the Korean model: there is a truce, there is a demarcation line, but the war is not formally over. Such a “cessation of war” can last for decades.
It does not require Ukraine to capitulate. It does not require Russia to admit defeat. It gives the U.S. and the EU a tool of control (through security guarantees, finances, observers). It gives a chance to begin economic recovery of Ukraine (including through frozen assets) without political capitulation.
And I think that now we should not talk about a “peace treaty,” but about a “treaty on the cessation of hostilities”, where the territorial issue is postponed, and security and recovery come to the fore.
Therefore, I consider Trump’s intention to immediately conclude a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia at this stage of events to be an unintentional mistake, although I understand his strong desire and approve of it. And all participants in the negotiation process should not mix two different stages—the stage of ending the war (cessation of hostilities) and the stage of political peace (final fixation). These stages have always been historically separated (the Korean War, Vietnam, even the Balkans).
Therefore, the formula “security guarantees + means of restoring Ukraine – in exchange for territories and an obligation not to join NATO” is also premature. However, America wants to achieve all this in one agreement. This formula is premature and unviable due to the incompatibility of logics.
For Ukraine, security and restoration are possible only with the preservation of territorial integrity. For Russia, on the contrary, “peace” is possible only with the recognition of territorial gains. These positions do not stick together.
Secondly, an attempt to link four heavy elements in one document makes the agreement unfeasible. Usually, such issues are resolved in stages (first a ceasefire, then humanitarian mechanisms, and then status agreements). There is a risk of legitimizing aggression.
Because if territorial concessions become part of the “price of peace,” this destroys the international order. The United States will achieve short-term success but will undermine its own leadership.
Thirdly, internal intransigence will arise within Russia and Ukraine. Neither Ukrainian society nor the Russian elite will be able to swallow all of these conditions at once. Such a “package” will explode from within. It is clear that America wants an “all-in deal,” but historical experience and the real balance of power require a step-by-step process, where each step is fixed separately. Moreover, Russia will always throw in another 100 of its own wishes for one Ukrainian one, as Zelensky said today.
After all, Moscow never comes to negotiations for the sake of a final decision, but for the sake of playing for time, squeezing out concessions and blurring the agenda. Even if Ukraine agrees to one painful compromise (for example, neutrality), Russia will immediately demand new ones: recognition of “new territories,” lifting of sanctions, return of assets, cancellation of military aid, etc. Because Russian diplomacy has historically been built on the fact that negotiations themselves become an instrument of war—they do not lead to a result, but replace it.
Because maintaining power in the Russian Federation is possible only through a constant “increasing stakes.” Any compromise within the country is interpreted as weakness. Any “comprehensive agreement” with Russia is doomed: the Kremlin will move the goalposts endlessly. Which is what it is doing now.
Ukraine’s “one wish” (restoration of sovereignty) will never coincide with Russia’s “hundred wishes,” because these are different logics: one is about law, the other is about bargaining with force. Therefore, the only working way is to segment the process and factor out what cannot be resolved now (territories, status).
The rational alternative looks like this:
1. A truce with fixed and verifiable conditions (fire ceases, lines are frozen de facto).
2. A financial package for Ukraine (frozen assets + allied assistance).
3. International security guarantees without capitulation conditions.
4. An open pause for a decade on the territorial issue.
In other words: “peace in Russian” will be equal to an endless trade in concessions, and “stopping the war” without peace is the only way to protect Ukraine and the system of international law.
Therefore, first we need an agreement to end the war and a declaration on segmentation of negotiations. Where a stop of the war (cessation of hostilities) is not “peace” and not “capitulation,” but a fixation of a pause to stop the blood and destruction.
The declaration on segmentation of negotiations should openly admit that territorial issues are not resolved immediately, humanitarian and financial issues are on their own track, security and guarantees are formalized separately, and political status and long-term architecture are postponed for the future.
The third step is a gradual texturalization: each side receives a “partial solution,” and the entire system is stabilized not through “one big treaty,” but through a network of parallel agreements. This will work better because the trap of “either peace or war” is removed, the capitulation logic is excluded, and space for international law is preserved (not to recognize territorial seizures, but also not to make them an obstacle to humanitarian steps). At the same time, each side can present the result as “its victory” for the domestic audience.
In my opinion, in essence, this will be the best formula for texturalism for the conflict:
“Ending the war + segmentation of negotiations = a controlled pause and a multi-level process instead of a fictitious peace.”
What do you think, friends?
